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Criminal Law. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d
813 (R.I. 1995). The Rhode Island Constitution article I, section 10
does not mandate that the State provide free counsel to indigent
defendants when incarceration will not actually be imposed on the
defendant.
The Rhode Island Constitution, article I, section 10 provides
that "[i]n all criminal proceedings, accused persons shall ... have
the assistance of counsel in their defense."' This is the state coun-
terpart to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantee in the
United States Constitution. 2 In an effort to clarify the constitu-
tional requirements under the Rhode Island Constitution, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, in In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov-
ernor,3 agreed to answer the question presented by the Governor
regarding indigent defendants' right to counsel. In its opinion, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court answered that, absent potential im-
prisonment, article I, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution
does not require that the state provide counsel to indigent
defendants.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Governor of the State of Rhode Island is under a constitu-
tional obligation to "prepare and present to the General Assembly
an annual, consolidated operating and capital improvement state
budget."4 Additionally, the Governor has the obligation to make
certain modifications to balance the budget during any given fiscal
year5 which may include the allocation of state funds for providing
indigent defendants with counsel for their defense. 6
In light of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's Executive Or-
der No. 94-02-E.O. dated June 27, 19947 and in accordance with
1. R.I. Const. art. I § 10.
2. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
3. 666 A.2d 813, 816 (R.I. 1995).
4. R.I. Const. art. IX § 15.
5. R.I. Gen. Laws § 35-3-16 (1994).
6. Id.
7. Advisory Opinion, 666 A.2d at 815 (The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court issued an executive order "prohibiting appointment of counsel to assist indi-
gent litigants 'save where constitutionally required' ").
SURVEY SECTION
article I, section 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution,8 the Governor
of the State of Rhode Island requested an advisory opinion from
the supreme court. Presented before the court was the following
question:
In view of the historical development of the law relating to
the right of appointed counsel under the federal and state
constitutions, and the more recent developments in federal
case law, is the State of Rhode Island required by the Rhode
Island Constitution to provide free legal counsel to indigents
notwithstanding that the trial court justice determined that
no incarceration will be imposed?9
BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution man-
dates that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 10 In
Gideon v. Wainwright," the Supreme Court held that the constitu-
tional right to counsel requirement was applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 yet did not outline the ac-
tual boundaries of the right.1 3 Subsequently, in Argersinger v.
Hamlin,14 the Supreme Court determined that the right to counsel
extended to all indigent misdemeanor defendants when faced with
a potential jail sentence. Seven years later, in Scott v. Illinois 5
the Court addressed the question of whether an indigent facing no
term of imprisonment was entitled to appointed counsel. The Scott
court held that the Sixth Amendment requires "only that no indi-
gent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
unless the state has afforded him the right to the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel in his defense."1 6 The Supreme Court recently re-
8. The Rhode Island Constitution article X, section 3, provides that "[tihe
judges of the supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any question of
law whenever requested by the governor or by either house of the general assem-
bly." R.I. Const. art. X § 3.
9. Advisory Opinion, 666 A.2d at 814.
10. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
14. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
15. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
16. Id. at 374.
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affirmed the holdings of Argersinger and Scott in Nichols v. United
States. 17
The Rhode Island Constitution, article I, section 10 provides
that "[iun all criminal proceedings, accused persons shall.., have
the assistance of counsel in their defense."i8 In 1971, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court examined the right to counsel provision of
the Rhode Island Constitution in State v. Holliday. 19 In Holliday,
the court interpreted the state constitutional right to counsel more
broadly than its federal counterpart so as to require the appoint-
ment of counsel to indigent defendants charged with misdemean-
ors that carry a potential imprisonment in excess of sixth months,
even where no such imprisonment was to be actually imposed. 20
After its decision in Holliday, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
twice again confronted the right to counsel issue, in State v. Mo-
retti2 1 and in State v. Medeiros.2 2 In both instances, the court fol-
lowed the Holliday decision "uncritically."23
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
Although the federal standard may represent a minimum
threshold requirement of protection, in that states may impose
greater protection under their own constitutions, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has generally interpreted other Rhode Island Con-
stitutional guarantees to be coextensive with the United States
Constitution.24 In Advisory Opinion, the court cautioned that any-
time a Rhode Island constitutional provision is to be interpreted as
providing more protection than the federal counterpart, such deci-
17. 114 S.Ct. 1921 (1994).
18. R.I. Const. art. I § 10.
19. 280 A.2d 333 (R.I. 1971).
20. Id. at 336-37.
21. State v. Moretti, 521 A.2d 1003 (R.I. 1987).
22. State v. Medeiros, 535 A.2d 766 (R.I. 1987).
23. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813, 816 (R.I. 1995).
24. See State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010 (R.I. 1992) (holding the protection of
article I, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution was identical in scope to the
federal counterpart); Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612
A.2d 734 (R.I. 1992) (the equal protection guarantees of article I, section 2, of the
Rhode Island Constitution are like that of the U.S. Constitution); State v. Diaz,
521 A.2d 129 (R.I. 1987) (holding the same for the double jeopardy clause of the
Rhode Island Constitution article I, section 7 and the Fifth Amendment).
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sion "should be made guardedly and supported by a principled
rationale."25
The court explained that at the time when Holliday was de-
cided, the court "had no means of ascertaining the direction [of] the
Supreme Court."26 However, by the time of the writing of the Ad-
visory Opinion, the Argersinger and Scott cases made clear the
United States Supreme Court's position that the Sixth Amend-
ment affords free legal counsel only where an indigent defendant
faces a potential jail sentence. In light of these decisions, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion does not afford an indigent defendant any greater protection
than the United States Constitution, thus overruling its decisions
in Moretti and Medeiros.
CONCLUSION
Given that this is an advisory opinion to the Governor, the
precedential value of the opinion may be limited. Nevertheless,
the opinion remains instructive as to whether the Rhode Island
Constitutional provision for the right to counsel is coextensive with
the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Scott. Accordingly, the State of Rhode Island is not re-
quired under the Rhode Island Constitution article I, section 10 to
provide free counsel to indigents when incarceration will not actu-
ally be imposed on the defendant. The right to counsel guarantee
under the Rhode Island Constitution is to be interpreted according
to the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Gideon,
Argersinger, Scott, and Nichols.
William T. Carline, III
25. Advisory Opinion, 666 A.2d at 816 (quoting State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895,
899 (R.I. 1980)).
26. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Beeley, 653 A.2d 722 (R.I. 1995). An in-
tervenor is justified in using reasonable force to defend another as
long as the intervenor reasonably believes that the other is being
attacked.
Prior to the decision of State v. Beeley, an intervenor was ex-
cused for his actions in defense of another only if the person he was
aiding would have been justified in acting. Under the rule adopted
in Beeley, Rhode Island now allows the finder of fact to consider the
intervenor's subjective perception of the circumstances instead of
limiting the inquiry to an entirely objective analysis.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, James Beeley, (Beeley) was tried and convicted
of breaking and entering and of simple assault in the Rhode Island
Superior Court for an incident that occurred on May 19, 1991.1 At
approximately 4:00 a.m. on that day, Beeley drove his friend John
Perry to an apartment where Perry had told Beeley he lived. The
two had just finished playing cards at another friend's house, and
Perry invited Beeley to spend the night because it was so late.
Beeley agreed, dropped Perry off, and went to park the car.2
Beeley testified that when he arrived at the apartment, he waited
outside because he could hear Perry and his wife yelling.3 He
banged on the apartment door, which opened, and Beeley could see
Perry being grabbed around the waist by a naked man. Beeley did
not know who this man was or what he was doing in the apart-
ment. According to Beeley, Perry was crying and yelled "[t]his is
the guy."4 Beeley then hit the man once to break his hold on
Perry.5 Perry's wife then called the police and Beeley took Perry
outside until the police arrived. 6
Beeley was convicted of breaking and entering and simple as-
sault by a jury in Rhode Island Superior Court. 7 On appeal, Beeley
first contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motions
1. State v. Beeley, 653 A.2d 722, 723 (R.I. 1995).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 724.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 723.
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requesting judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge of
breaking and entering.8 Beeley averred that he was entitled to a
judgement of acquittal on the breaking and entering charge based
on four theories.9 The supreme court concluded that after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a judgment of
acquittal was improperly denied because the record was "wholly
lacking any evidence that Beeley exerted force to effectuate a
break-in."10
Beeley next argued on appeal that he was entitled to a new
trial on the charge of simple assault. 11 The court examined the
principal question of "whether an intervenor in an altercation be-
tween private individuals should be judged by his or her own rea-
sonable perceptions or whether he or she stands in the shoes of the
person that he or she is defending?"12
BACKGROUND
While the court had addressed the issue of defense to third
parties on several occasions, most of those cases have involved a
defendant-intervenor aiding another in the context of an arrest sit-
uation.13 The first case in Rhode Island to address this issue was
State v. Small.'4 In Small, the court held that a defendant does
not have the right to use force against a police officer in circum-
stances in which it is obvious that the third person had no such
right.' 5 The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted this rule from
United States v. Davis,16 wherein the 5th Circuit held that a de-
fendant was not entitled to be acquitted of a charge of assaulting a
8. Id.
9. Id. at 724. Beeley's four theories were 1) that he did not break in, but
merely entered the apartment though an open doorway; 2) there was no evidence
that Beeley had any awareness of how Perry entered the apartment; 3) Perry had
a right to enter the apartment which was still legally his marital domicile and,
therefore, Perry's invitation to Beeley to enter the apartment constituted consent
in law, and 4) there was no trespass because the evidence demonstrates that
Beeley believed that Perry and his wife had been living together as husband and
wife. Id.
10. Id. at 725.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 726.
13. Id.
14. 410 A.2d 1336 (1980).
15. Id.
16. United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974, 975-76 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970).
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federal officer, despite the fact that he was acting to prevent death
or injury to his father. 17
In the same year Small was decided, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, in State v. Gelinas,'s adopted the rule that "one
who comes to the aid of an arrestee must do so at his own peril and
should be excused only when the individual would himself be justi-
fied in defending himself from the use of excessive force by the ar-
resting officer."' 9 In other words, "the defendant may use such
force to prevent injury to the person he aids as defendant would
use in self-defense." 20 The conclusions reached in Small and Ge-
linas were affirmed in 1982 in State v. Aptt. 2 1
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The court first noted that there are two rules followed by
American jurisdictions in determining whether a defendant is jus-
tified in defending a third party.22 The first rule is a purely objec-
tive standard called the "alter ego rule," which holds that the right
to defend another is coextensive with the other's right to defend
himself or herself.23 This is the rule which the trial court applied
in the instant case. 24
Other jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code, which infuses
a subjective element into the defense. 25 The Model Penal Code
states that as long as the defendant-intervenor reasonably believes
that the other is being unlawfully attacked, he or she is justified in
using reasonable force to defend him or her. 26
17. Id.
18. 417 A.2d 1381 (R.I. 1980).
19. Id. at 1386.
20. Id. (citing Model Penal Code § 3.05 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958)); See infra
note 21.
21. 441 A.2d 824 (R.I. 1982).
22. Beeley, 653 A.2d at 726.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 727.
25. Id. at 726.
26. Model Penal Code § 3.05, entitled "Use of Force for the Protection of Other
Persons" provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of
force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third
person when:
(a) the actor would be justified under Section 3.04 in using such force
to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to
the person whom he seeks to protect; and
SURVEY SECTION
The supreme court concluded that the Model Penal Code's ap-
proach is the better view. 27 The court stated that it "favors the
doctrine which judges a defendant upon his or her own reasonable
perceptions as he or she comes to the aid of the apparent victim."28
This reasoning is "predicated on the social desirability of encourag-
ing people to go to the aid of third parties who are in danger of
harm as a result of unlawful actions of others."29 The court con-
cluded that not only as a matter of justice should one "not be con-
victed of a crime if he selflessly attempts to protect the victim of an
apparently unjustified assault, but how else can we encourage by-
standers to go to the aid of another who is being subjected to as-
sault?"3 0 Moreover, the court believed that to impose liability upon
the defendant-intervenor in these circumstances is to impose lia-
bility upon him without fault.3 1
In the instant matter, the court adopted the rule that an inter-
venor is justified in using reasonable force to defend another as
long as the intervenor reasonably believes that the other is being
attacked.3 2 However, the court reserved the Gelinas rule solely for
defendant-intervenors in an arrest situation.3 3 Accordingly, the
court vacated the judgements of conviction against Beeley and re-
manded the case to superior court for a new trial on the assault
charges. 34
CONCLUSION
Prior to Beeley, an intervenor was excused for his actions only
if the person he was aiding would have been justified in acting in
self defense. In Beeley, the court infused a subjective element into
the defense of using force for the protection of other persons. The
court acknowledged in Beeley, that the new rule is "predicated on
(b) under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the per-
son whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protec-
tive force; and
(c) the actor believes that his intervention is necessary for the protec-
tion of such other person. Model Penal Code § 3.05(1) (Adopted 1962).
27. Beeley, 653 A.2d at 726.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 727.
34. Id.
1996]
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the social desirability of encouraging people to go to the aid of third
parties who are in danger of harm as a result of unlawful actions of
others."35
Heather L. Pearlman
35. Beeley, 653 A.2d at 727 (quoting Commonwealth v. Monico, 366 N.E.2d
1241, 1244 (Mass. 1977)).
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Criminal Law. State v. Griffith, 600 A.2d 704 (R.I. 1995). A trial
justice must instruct the jury on mens rea unless there is strict
liability via the statutory language.
A trial justice must instruct a jury on all elements of an of-
fense, including the mens rea of the defendant. Mens rea is de-
fined as a guilty knowledge and wilfulness. 1 In State v. Griffith,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined that a trial justice
is under a specific duty to instruct the jury on the mens rea, de-
spite the fact that the statute did not specifically address intent.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Ralph Griffith was convicted of first degree child molestation
sexual assault under Rhode Island General Laws section 11-37-
8.1.3 During jury instructions, the trial judge read the statute to
the jury as well as the standard of proof required in order for a jury
to convict the defendant under section 11-37-8.1. 4 The standard of
proof is that the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant engaged in sexual penetration and the victim was
under fourteen years of age. 5 However, the trial judge did not de-
scribe the intent or mens rea required to convict a defendant under
the first degree child molestation sexual assault charge. 6 The jury
returned a guilty verdict against the defendant on one count of
first degree child molestation sexual assault.7
The defendant appealed, alleging the trial judge erred as a re-
sult of his failure "to instruct the jury that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's acts were for the pur-
pose of his own sexual arousal or gratification."8 In other words,
the defendant alleged the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the
1. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3rd Cir. 1943); See Model
Penal Code § 2.02.
2. State v. Griffith, 660 A.2d 704, 706-07 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 1956 (1981 Reenactment) as amended by
1984 R.I. Pub.Law ch. 5, § 2 which provides: A person is guilty of first degree sex-
ual assault if he or she engages in sexual penetration with a person fourteen (14)
years of age or under.
4. Griffith, 660 A.2d at 706-07; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 (G.L.1956).
5. Griffith, 660 A.2d at 706.
6. Id. at 707; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 (G.L.1956); See supra note 3.
7. Griffith, 660 A.2d at 706.
8. Id.
1996]
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jury that the state had to prove the defendant's intent or mens
rea.9 The issue on appeal was whether a trial judge is required to
instruct a jury on intent/mens rea in cases of first degree sexual
assault where the statute does not speak to intent or mens rea of
the defendant.
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held in State v. Tobin 10 that
the second degree sexual assault statute did not contain an express
intent or mens rea requirement, and if the statute were read liter-
ally, it would permit criminal liability without any proof of mens
rea. 11 In Tobin, the defendant was convicted of second degree sex-
ual assault.12 There, the supreme court determined that when a
defendant is charged with second degree sexual assault a trial
judge must instruct the jury that in order for them to convict the
defendant on this particular crime, "one must find that the defend-
ant acted with the intent of 'sexual arousal, gratification, or as-
sault.' "13 In addition, the Court explained that the existence of a
mens rea is the rule and not the exception in American jurispru-
dence, and is a principle deeply rooted in our legal system.14 More-
over, the absence of the mens rea requirement in a statute does not
indicate that the Rhode Island legislature did not require a specific
mental state, but that the legislature "recognized that intent was
so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory
affirmation. "15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, basing its decision on the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Morissette v.
United States, determined that the first degree child molestation
statute carried an implied intent requirement. 16 The supreme
9. Id.
10. State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528 (R.I. 1992).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 535.
14. Id. at 534.
15. Id. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952))(mere
omission of any mention of intent is not to be construed as eliminating that ele-
ment from the crimes defined).
16. Griffith, 660 A.2d at 706 (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.).
SURVEY SECTION
court stated that section 8-2-38 of the Rhode Island General Laws
requires a trial justice to instruct the jury on all elements of a
criminal charge.17 When a judge fails to carry out this statutory
requirement, the "ensuing conviction must be vacated."18 The
court held that the first degree child molestation statute has an
implied mens rea element that requires the state to prove a de-
fendant acted with the intent of sexual arousal or gratification in
order to be convicted of the offense, just as the second degree child
molestation statute was interpreted in Tobin.19 The court further
determined that while the Rhode Island legislature is perfectly
within its purview to "enact strict liability statutes devoid of any
mens rea," the first degree child molestation statute is not such a
statute. 20 Because the trial judge failed to give the jury the proper
instruction regarding the defendant's mens rea, the conviction was
vacated and remanded for a new trial.21
CONCLUSION
As a general rule, a trial judge must instruct the jury on all
elements of a criminal offense, including the mens rea of the de-
fendant in committing the crime charged. 22 When the statute does
not specifically address intent, the intent is deemed implicit within
the statute. As a result, the state has the burden of proving the
intent was present when the defendant committed the crime and
the trial judge is under an obligation to instruct the jury that the
state has such a burden.
Whitney A. Curtis
17. Id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-2-38 1956 (1985 Reenactment).
18. Griffith, 660 A.2d at 706, (citing Tobin, 602 A.2d at 534-35); See also State
v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770, 772 (R.I. 1988).
19. Griffith, 660 A.2d at 706.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 707.
22. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954 (R.I. 1995). Jurors
involved in unauthorized experiments will be permitted to testify
whether these alleged actions took place, but will not be permitted
to testify as to the process itself.
Generally, jurors are not permitted to testify regarding the
jury deliberations in order to impeach the verdict.1 In State v.
Hartley, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that if a
trial judge determines that extraneous information was improp-
erly brought before the jury and such information would influence
a reasonable juror, then that information will be considered preju-
dicial and the defendant will be granted a new trial.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Richard Hartley was convicted in superior court of robbery. 3
At trial, the defendant tried to show that the victim had mistaken
him for a man named Louis Marchetti, who was a friend of both
the defendant and an accomplice in the robbery. 4 The defendant
also presented eight alibi witnesses that testified he was at his
grandmother's home in Providence, celebrating her birthday at the
time of the robbery. 5 The defendant was convicted and thereafter
filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict went
against the weight of the evidence. 6 He later supplemented the
motion with another claim that a new trial was required based on
newly available evidence.7 The trial judge denied the motion for a
new trial.8
Seven and a half months after the verdict, defense counsel re-
ceived sworn affidavits from two members of the jury alleging acts
of juror misconduct in that evidence not presented at trial had
been brought to the jury's attention.9 Allegedly, an unnamed juror
had driven from the defendant's grandmother's house to the scene
of the robbery, timed the trip, and told the other jurors that the
1. R.I. R. Evid. 606(b); See Palmigiano v. State, 387 A.2d 1382 (R.I. 1978).
2. State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954 (R.I. 1995).
3. Id. at 955.
4. Id. at 956.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
defendant had time to leave the party, commit the robbery and re-
turn.'0 This was referred to as the "unauthorized view/experi-
ment."'1 After receiving these affidavits, defendant filed another
motion for a new trial, alleging that such juror misconduct denied
him his constitutional right to a fair trial.12 The trial judge denied
this motion for a new trial, stating that the juror affidavits con-
tained "hearsay within hearsay" and did not constitute sufficient
grounds to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to support the grant-
ing of a new trial. 13 Defendant appealed his conviction and the
denial of his motions for a new trial.14
BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as
well as the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island, guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses against him. 15
It has been well established under Rhode Island law that the use of
juror affidavits about juror conduct either before or during their
deliberations is not permissible to impeach the jury verdict. 16 The
rationale of this policy is to maintain the public interest in the fi-
nality of jury verdicts.' 7 To reach this end, jury verdicts are ac-
corded a conclusiveness that will preserve the stability of the jury
trial as an instrument for doing substantial justice."'8 The court in
Palmigiano v. State' 9 stated one exception to the rule prohibiting
the use of juror affidavits regarding the jury's conduct from being
used to impeach the verdict.20 Juror affidavits can be used "for the
10. Id. at 957.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 956-957.
13. Id. at 957.
14. Id.
15. U.S. Const. amend. VI; R.I.Const. art. 1, sec. 10.
16. Palmigiano v. State, 387 A.2d 1382, 1385 (R.I. 1978). The supreme court,
prior to the adoption of Rule 606(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, used the
federal approach regarding juror impeachment with the use of juror affidavits.
This was essentially the same approach that Rule 606(b) advocated after its adop-
tion, except in regards to the unauthorized view/experiment of jurors. Id.; R.I. R.
Evid. 606(b).
17. Palumbo v. Garrott, 188 A.2d 371 (R.I. 1963). Another case regarding the
prohibition of juror affidavits detailing juror misconduct to impeach the verdict
decided prior to the adoption of Rule 606(b). Id.
18. Id. at 374.
19. Palmigiano, 387 A.2d at 1385.
20. Id.
1996]
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sole purpose of demonstrating that matters not in evidence
reached the jury through outside communications .... .21 Rule
606(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence codified this general
rule regarding the inquiry into the validity of the jury verdict.22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Based upon these principles, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
determined that the jurors who allegedly engaged in outside con-
versations about the case should be permitted to testify as to
whether such conversations actually occurred. 23 The remaining
jurors should be allowed to testify as to whether any extraneous
information was conveyed to them and under what circumstances
it was done. 24 However, no juror would be allowed to testify about
any portion of the deliberative process, including the effect, if any,
the extraneous information may have had on them.25
Following the adoption of Rule 606 of the Rhode Island Rules
of Evidence, questions arose as to "whether juror testimony regard-
ing an unauthorized juror view should be admitted under the ex-
ception that allows juror testimony to show that extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's atten-
tion."2 6 In this case, the Court held that juror testimony regarding
unauthorized juror views falls within the exception specified in
Rule 606(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 27 The court's
holding in this instance answered the question left open by its pre-
vious decision in State v. Drowne.28
In Drowne, Joseph Drowne was convicted of burglary and sim-
ple assault after a jury trial.29 During the polling of the jury, one
21. Id.
22. R.I. R. Evid. 606(b) provides: "... a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror."
23. State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954, 959 (R.I. 1995).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 960.
27. Id. The court agreed with the advisory committee note to Rule 606 that
said evidence of an unauthorized juror view falls within the exception of Rule 606.
The court further regarded juror experiments to fall within the same exception.
Id.
28. Id.; State v. Drowne, 602 A.2d 540, 542 n.1 (R.I. 1992).
29. Drowne, 602 A.2d at 541.
SURVEY SECTION
juror gave an equivocal response regarding one of the charges.30 A
hearing was conducted in order to interview the juror.31 Following
the hearing, the trial judge refused to grant the defendant's motion
for a mistrial and defendant appealed.3 2 Rule 606(b) of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence prohibits a juror from impeaching a ver-
dict.3 3 While relying on cases decided prior to the adoption of Rule
606(b), the court in Drowne determined that the use of juror affida-
vits regarding jurors actions both before and during their delibera-
tions is impermissible to impeach the jury verdict.34 What Drowne
left unanswered was whether to include evidence of an unauthor-
ized juror view as falling within the exception to the rule of exclu-
sion of juror testimony with regard to juror misconduct.35 The
court resolved this issue in Hartley.
In answering the question left open in Drowne, the court de-
termined that the juror who conducted the experiment should be
allowed to testify as to its occurrence as well as the findings that
were given to the fellow jurors. 36 The court further determined
that even if the trial judge finds that such information did reach
the jury, that is not in and of itself enough to grant a new trial.37
The judge must also determine that the defendant was prejudiced
by this information. 38 To determine the prejudicial effect of extra-
neous information the trial judge must consider the probable effect
that the information would have on an average reasonable juror.3 9
If the information would probably influence the decision of an aver-
age reasonable juror, then the information is prejudicial and relief
should be granted.40 As a result of its holding, the court remanded
the case.4 1
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 542.
33. Id.; R.I. R. Evid. 606(b).
34. Drowne, 602 A.2d at 543; See also, State v. Palamigiano 341 A.2d 742, 743
(R.I. 1975); Palumbo v. Garrott, 188 A.2d 371 (R.I. 1963).
35. Drowne, 602 A.2d at 542 n.1.
36. Hartley, 656 A.2d at 960.
37. Id. at 960-961.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 962.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Hartley clarifies Rhode Island law in the area of juror testi-
mony impeaching a jury verdict. If a trial judge determines that
extraneous information was improperly brought before the jury
which would probably influence the decision of an average reason-
able juror then that information is prejudicial and the defendant
must be granted a new trial.
Whitney A. Curtis
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Criminal Law. State v. Lamphere, 658 A.2d 900 (R.I. 1995). A
trial judge must sua sponte provide a limiting instruction when
evidence of prior bad acts is admitted.
Evidence of a defendant's commission of prior bad acts are
only admissible at trial to show "motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident,
or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that
the fear was reasonable."" They may not be used to show that the
defendant was likely to commit the act with which he is charged.
2
In State v. Lamphere, the Supreme Court determined that the use
of such acts, without a limiting instruction to the jury, constitutes
reversible error as it prejudices the defendant.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
David Lamphere was convicted of second degree child molesta-
tion in Superior Court. 4 At trial, evidence was introduced regard-
ing previously alleged, but uncharged, acts of sexual assault
against the child victim. 5 The trial judge, while charging the jury,
did not give a limiting instruction regarding the use of the above
evidence. 6 Following deliberation, the jury convicted the defend-
ant on all six counts of second degree child molestation.
7
On appeal, the defendant claimed the trial judge committed
reversible error in six particular instances s the first being the
1. R.I. R. Evid. 404(b): Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defend-
ant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable.
2. Id.
3. State v. Lamphere, 658 A.2d 900, 906 (R.I. 1995).
4. Id. at 901.
5. Id. at 903. (These uncharged acts were testified to by the victim, at trial.)
Id.
6. Id. at 904.
7. Id. at 903.
8. (1) failing to give a limiting instruction regarding several uncharged acts
of sexual assault testified to at trial, (2) refusing to limit the jury's deliberations to
the bill of particulars, (3) impermissibly limiting defense counsel's cross examina-
tion of certain state witnesses, particularly with respect to their prejudices and
biases, (4) refusing to allow defense counsel to inquire into the whereabouts of
Teddy Lamphere during a cross-examination, (5) denying defendant's motion in
19961
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judge's failure to give a limiting instruction with respect to various
"uncharged acts of sexual assault testified to at trial" by the vic-
tim.9 Defendant admitted that the evidence was properly admissi-
ble to show his "lewd disposition or design" towards the victim, but
contended that the failure to give a limiting instruction allowed
the jury to use the evidence impermissibly.10 Conversely, the state
conceded that although a limiting instruction should have been
given, the defendant was not prejudiced by this failure because de-
fense counsel had opportunity to inquire into these "uncharged
acts" during the cross examination of the victim."
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island has taken the view that "evidence of prior un-
charged acts of misconduct" cannot be used "to demonstrate a de-
fendant's propensity to commit the crime charged."' 2 However,
Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence permits evi-
dence of "prior bad acts" to be admitted to show "motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent
bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable." 13 Similarly, the
court in State v. Jalette14 held, prior to the adoption of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence that, "evidence of other not too remote"
uncharged sexual crimes against the victim of the current sexual
assault being tried can be admitted into evidence to show the "lewd
disposition.., or intent" of the defendant toward the victim. '5 Fol-
limine which sought to preclude the use of his prior criminal convictions by the
prosecution if he chose to testify, and (6) refusing to conduct a voir dire of the jury
for potential prejudice arising from some members' possible observation of the vic-
tim crying in the hallway of the court house while being comforted by a relative.
Id. at 903.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 903.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 904; See also State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 531 (R.I. 1992)(evidence
of other acts not admissible to prove defendant's criminal disposition); State v.
Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 179 (R.I. 1983)(evidence of independant, past criminal be-
havior unconnected with crimes for which defendant is on trial may not be used to
show commission of crime); State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526, 531-32 (R.I. 1978)(evi-
dence which tends to indicate accused has committed another crime independent
of that for which he is on trial is generally inadmissible); R.I. R. Evid. 404.
13. R.I. R. Evid. 404; Jalette, 382 A.2d at 532; See supra note 1.
14. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526.
15. Jalette, 382 A.2d at 533.
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lowing the adoption of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the
rules enunciated in Jalette were reaffirmed. 16
Finally, in State v. Toole, the court stated that during a sexual
assault case the trial judge has a sua sponte obligation "to offer a
limiting instruction when admitting evidence of other sexual acts
despite the general principle enunciated in Rule 105 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence 17 that a limiting instruction is to be given
upon request."18
ANALysIs AND HOLDING
In the instant matter, due to the state's concession that a lim-
iting instruction should have been given, the sole issue before the
court was whether the failure to give the instruction constituted
reversible error.' 9 The court relied on Toole to determine whether
the actions of the trial judge in this instance constituted reversible
error.20 In Toole, the trial judge's failure to issue a limiting in-
struction after uncharged acts of sexual assault were admitted did
not cause reversible error. This was so because numerous times
during the trial "defense counsel [had] utilized and referred to the
evidence that [defendant] call[ed] objectionable... ,21 In addition,
the defendant in Toole never filed a motion in limine seeking to
exclude the evidence, nor did defense counsel ever seek a limiting
instruction be given to the jury.22 Finally, in Toole, defense coun-
sel used this evidence to the defendant's advantage during the
cross-examination of the victim. 23 As a result of the defendant's
never complaining about the admission of the evidence, the
Supreme Court in Toole held that the trial judge's failure to grant
a limiting instruction did not constitute reversible error.24
16. State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 971 (R.I. 1994).
17. R.I. R. Evid. 105. Limited Admissibility. "When evidence which is admis-
sible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or
for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evi-
dence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."
18. Toole, 640 A.2d at 971.
19. Lamphere, 658 A.2d at 904.
20. Id. at 904-05; See Toole supra note 16.
21. Lamphere, 658 A.2d 904, (citing Toole, 640 A.2d at 971).
22. Toole, 640 A.2d at 971.
23. Id.
24. Id.
1996]
276 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:213
In State v. Lamphere, the number of uncharged acts admitted
into evidence far exceeded the amount in Toole.25 Additionally, de-
fendant in this case filed a motion in limine to preclude testimony
of certain uncharged acts, which was denied by the trial judge.26
Following the judge's denial of the motion, defense counsel re-
quested a cautionary instruction be given to the jury when the wit-
ness would testify regarding these specific uncharged acts, but the
judge also denied this request.27 It was only after the denial of the
motion and the cautionary instruction that defense counsel used
this evidence in cross-examination. 28 Based upon the distinguish-
able facts of Toole, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined in
the instant matter that the trial judge's failures to provide a limit-
ing instruction to the jury constituted reversible error as it was
"reasonably possible that such [unrestrained] evidence would in-
fluence an average jury on the ultimate issue of guilt or
innocence."29
CONCLUSION
This case makes clear that when any evidence of "prior bad
acts" is admitted into evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Is-
land Rules of Evidence, the trial judge must sua sponte give the
jury a limiting instruction regarding the use of such evidence in
their deliberations. Here, where evidence was admitted regarding
other uncharged sexual acts by the defendant against the victim,
the judge had a sua sponte obligation to issue a limiting instruc-
tion. Accordingly, the judge's failure to give such instruction con-
stituted reversible error.
Whitney A. Curtis
25. Lamphere, 658 A.2d at 904.
26. Id. at 905.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 906.
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Criminal Law. State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912 (R.I. 1995). A fel-
ony must be inherently dangerous to human life, based on the at-
tendant circumstances of the particular case, in order to serve as
the predicate to a second-degree felony-murder charge.
In State v. Stewart,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that permitting a child to be a habitual sufferer pursuant to sec-
tion 11-9-5 of the Rhode Island General Laws,2 a felony not enu-
merated in the murder statute, is inherently dangerous to human
life where a mother's neglect over a three day "cocaine marathon"
caused her infant son's death.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Tracy Stewart (defendant) and Edward Young had their third
child Travis Young (Travis) on August 31, 1988.4 On October 21,
1988, fifty-two days after birth, Travis died from dehydration. 5
Travis spent the days prior to his death in the company of his
mother and father, and their friend, Patricia McMasters (McMas-
ters), all of whom were regular cocaine abusers. 6 The three used
cocaine in the presence of Travis by intravenous injection and by
inhaling smoke from its base form,7 which allowed the threesome
to spend three sleepless days intoxicated by cocaine.8 During that
time Travis's mother never held Travis nor changed his clothes
and, on one occasion, she fed Travis by propping a bottle up on his
walker using a rolled up towel.9
After the trial court's denial of defendant's motions for dismis-
sal and for acquittal, the jury convicted her of second-degree fel-
l. 663 A.2d 912 (R.I. 1995).
2. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5 (1994) states: "Every person having the custody or
control of any child under the age of eighteen (18) years ... who shall wrongfully
cause or permit that child to be an habitual sufferer for want of food, clothing,
proper care, or oversight .... shall be guilty of a felony."
3. Stewart, 663 A.2d at 915.
4. Id. at 915.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Stewart, 663 A.2d at 915. Ironically, most of the money supporting this
cocaine binge came from recently cashed Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) checks designed to help care for Travis. Id. at 916.
8. Id. at 916.
9. Id.
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ony-murder. 10 The question rising from the defendant's appeal
was whether wrongfully permitting a child to be a habitual suf-
ferer is an inherently dangerous felony and therefore sufficient to
be the predicate for a conviction of second-degree felony-murder.'1
BACKGROUND
At common law, "one whose conduct brought about an unin-
tended death in the commission or attempted commission of a fel-
ony was guilty of murder."' 2 This is known as the "felony-murder"
rule. To limit the broad sweep of the felony-murder rule as it ex-
isted at common law, some American jurisdictions, such as Rhode
Island, enumerated the specific felonies that give rise to first-de-
gree murder. 13 To insure accountability when death results from
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony not enumer-
ated, the murder statute classifies any other felony-murder as sec-
ond degree murder. 14
Rhode Island's murder statute lists certain crimes which may
serve as the predicate felonies for a charge of first degree murder. 1
5
Additionally, death resulting from a felony not listed in the statute
may give rise to second-degree murder but only when that felony is
inherently dangerous. 16
Generally, there are two ways for a court to decide whether a
felony is inherently dangerous. One way is to examine the ele-
10. Id.
11. Stewart, 663 A.2d at 917.
12. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.5
at 206, (1986).
13. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 (1994). See infra note 15 for a list of the felonies
that give rise to first degree murder.
14. Id. After the list of enumerated felonies the statute simply reads, "[any
other murder is murder in the second degree." Id.
15. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 (1994) states: "Every murder ... committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson or... rape, any degree of
sexual assault or child molestation, burglary or breaking and entering, robbery,
kidnapping, or committed during the course of the perpetration, or attempted per-
petration, of felony manufacture, sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled
substance,... or while resisting arrest by, or under arrest of, any state trooper or
police officer in the performance of his or her duty. .. ."
16. Stewart, 663 A.2d at 918. The inherent danger necessity provides the ba-
sis for transferring the malice from the intended felony to the unintended homi-
cide. See 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 148 at 304 (15th ed.
1994).
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ments of the felony in the abstract.17 Another way is to take into
account the circumstances of the particular case.18 This approach
takes into consideration that many felonies may be committed in a
manner which is not inherently dangerous but were committed in
a predictably life threatening manner. 19
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
In Stewart, the court announced how to determine whether a
felony is inherently dangerous for purposes of the felony-murder
rule. The defendant urged the court to look at the elements of the
felony in the abstract as California does. 20 This method requires
the court to find insufficient danger if the underlying felony can be
perpetrated or attempted in any way not dangerous to human
life.21 The court declined to adopt that approach because "a
number of felonies at first glance would not appear to present an
inherent danger to human life but may in fact be committed in
such a manner as to be inherently dangerous to life."22 Rather, in
Stewart, the court reasoned that the proper method in Rhode Is-
land "is to present the facts and circumstances of the particular
case to the trier of fact to determine if a particular felony is inher-
ently dangerous in the manner and circumstances in which it was
committed."23
The court buttressed its rejection of the California approach by
noting a recent amendment to the Rhode Island murder statute,24
whereby, homicide involved with the delivery of PCP is murder in
the first degree.25 Conversely, in California, it was recently held
that furnishing PCP was not an inherently dangerous felony be-
17. Stewart, 663 A.2d at 918.
18. Id. at 919. Torcia, supra note 16, § 148 at 305. This approach stems from
a general reluctance to apply the felony-murder rule because the number of felo-
nies has increased and many of them are for minor offenses. Lafave supra note 12,
§ 7.5 at 207.
19. Id. at 304. Therefore the malice, with which the felony was committed, is
transferred from the felony to the homicide. Id.
20. Stewart, 663 A.2d at 918.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 919.
23. Id.
24. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 (1994).
25. Id.
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cause it does not carry a high enough probability of death to serve
as an underlying felony for felony-murder. 26
The evidence in Stewart showed that the defendant did not
change or feed her baby more than once during her three day co-
caine binge.27 The evidence further proved that this neglect was
the cause of the Travis' dehydration resulting in his death. 28 Ulti-
mately, the court held that the manner and circumstances of the
defendant's neglect were sufficient to establish that the child was
wrongfully permitted to be a habitual sufferer in a manner inher-
ently dangerous to human life. 29
CONCLUSION
In Stewart the court held that under the felony-murder rule in
Rhode Island, inherent danger must be gauged in the light of the
attendant circumstances of the felony committed, rather than by
looking at the felony in the abstract, in order to deter the commis-
sion of dangerous felonies or dissuade co-felons from participating
in a crime dangerous enough to result in death.
Kenneth K. McKay, IV
26. People v. Taylor, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1804, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 (Cal. 1992).
27. Stewart, 663 A.2d at 916.
28. Id. at 927.
29. Id. at 920.
